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INTRODUCTION
Adam Przeworski's article is entitled "Could We Feed Everyone?" Since his
discussion of this question is very sketchy and my knowledge of the relevant
issues is even sketchier, I will not consider it here. The article is subtitled 'The
Irrationality of Capitalism and the Infeasibility of Socialism." Przeworski's
analysis of this issue is deep and illuminating, and in my commentary I will
concentrate on this analysis. There is much in it that I agree with, in particular the
discussions of market socialism and social democracy in the section entitled
"What Can Be Reformed?" and the concluding remarks about the importance of
politics. (p. 25)1 But since explorations of these points of agreement would not
make for interesting debate, I will focus here on four points of disagreement.
First, Przeworski's discussion is confined to a comparison of the welfare
consequences of alternative political-economic constitutions where "welfare" is
understood subjectively as the satisfaction of defacto preferences. He appears,
that is, to rely on the "subjective welfarist" view that the only information relevant
to evaluating social states is information about the consequences of those states
for the satisfaction of preferences. I do not think that subjective welfarism is a
reasonable normative political conception, nor do I agree that the fundamental
values in the socialist tradition are best understood in these terms.2 A more
reasonable view, and one that better captures those values, draws on a "demo-
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cratic" conception of the ideals of liberty, equality, and community. In the next
section, I will sketch such a conception.
Second, Przeworski's discussion of alternative political-economic arrange-
ments is organized around a contrast between the rationality of systems and their
feasibility. I do not find the distinction illuminating in part because I think the
contrast itself is artificial and in part because the account of rationality inherits
the weaknesses of the subjective welfarist normative framework. I explore these
issues in my section entitled "Rationality and Feasibility."
Third, Przeworski suggests that what he calls the "socialist blueprint" pro-
vides an attractive ideal that is unattainable because people are self-interested. In
my section entitled "Attractions of the Blueprint: The Administration of Things,"
I suggest that there are flaws in the blueprint that do not arise from the fact of
self-interest but instead reflect tensions between the ideal of a "rational admin-
istration of things to satisfy human needs" that is embodied in the blueprint and
the inevitable disagreements among reasonable people in an ideally democratic
society.
Finally, I think that an assessment of the compatibility of markets with the
democratic ideals that underlie the socialist tradition is more complicated than at
least parts (in particular the earlier parts) of Przeworski's discussion suggest and
that it depends both on the institutional/organizational setting in which markets
exist and on the motivational implications of that setting.3 In my section entitled
"The Limits of Markets," I elaborate on this final point.
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
A Free Community of Equals
Consider a society whose members all have equal access to the advantages
of social cooperation, regardless of their natural differences or the social back-
grounds into which they are born. Knowing whether they are born male or female;
black, white, or brown; or musically gifted or sympathetically endowed does not
help us to predict their rights or the resources they will have to use those rights
over the course of their lives. While resources may differ, such differences can
be traced to decisions that reflect their diverse understandings of what is valuable
in life.
Suppose, too, that those diverse understandings are endorsed under free
conditions. Secure in their person, citizens are confident that they can reflect
without constraint and express without censorship and that they have a fair chance
of participating along with others in setting the basic terms of their common social
and political life. Exercising these liberties of conscience and association, expres-
sion and political participation, they act sometimes alone and sometimes in
concert with others in pursuit of their conceptions of a good human life.
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Assume further that the members of the society recognize that such pluralism
about matters of value comes with the human territory.4 They accept the premise
that reasonable people disagree about what is good, while at the same time
affirming in common and with mutual respect, the values of liberty and equality
that define their society. While their precise interpretations of the values of liberty
and equality differ, their shared convictions are sufficiently strong that they
willingly support the political and economic arrangements that advance these
values, and they agree to pursue their disagreements within the framework defined
by those arrangements. In particular, they willingly act in ways that contribute to
the common advantage without demanding rewards for their contributions that
conflict with it. And because of those willing contributions, the egalitarian
distribution of advantage is consistent with a reasonable level of advantage for
all.
Here we have a (breezy and abstract) statement of one interpretation of the
ideals of equality, liberty, and community and of the connections between those
ideals and material prosperity. Equality is achieved in that the distribution of
social advantage does not reflect social and natural differences but rather differ-
ences of aspiration affirmed under free conditions. Conditions are free because
people can-substantively and not just as a matter of right-reflect and deliberate
about what is valuable, associate with others in pursuit of those values, and
participate in the political life of their community. There is community because,
disagreements and diversity of values notwithstanding, a moral consensus exists
on the principles of freedom and equality that define the terms of social order.
And these conditions contribute to material prosperity because the common
allegiance to the principles leads citizens to "exert effort independently of
reward." 5 (p. 12).
Some Implications?
This democratic ideal of a free community of equals is featured in, even if
not peculiar to, the socialist tradition or at least in the democratic strand of that
tradition. By the "democratic strand," I mean that line of socialist thought that
embraces the values of liberty and equality associated with modem democratic
thought; acknowledges the pluralism of values that follows on the protection of
fundamental liberties of conscience, expression, and association; and endorses
the importance of democratic political institutions as essential conditions for the
realization of those values.
What distinguishes the socialist strand within the democratic tradition is not
its embracing of the ideal of a free community of equals, but its contention that
private property and markets provide fundamental constraints on the realization
of that ideal.6 The connections between the values of liberty, equality, and
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community and the sources of hostility to private ownership and markets can be
summarized roughly as follows:
1. Private ownership and markets inevitably tie material compensation to
ownership or contribution and in so doing generate an unjustifiably unequal
distribution of advantage.
2. Private ownership and markets constrain politics to adapt to the decisions of
owners or market actors so a wide range of decisions of fundamental social
importance-what is produced, where enterprises are located, how present
and future benefits are traded off-are made by private individuals, and
collective choices must accommodate themselves to those decisions. This
imposes unjustifiable constraints on popular sovereignty and so on political
liberty.
3. Private ownership and markets structure individual choice in a way that
encourages individuals to attend to their own advantage without explicit
attention to the implications of their actions for others. Thus they discourage
the widespread allegiance to norms of substantive equality and liberty that
defines a pluralistic, democratic community.
But "[i]f something is wrong with one system because it is wrong with all
conceivable systems, little of interest follows." (pp. 2-3) So the force of these
three criticisms depends on the availability of an alternative form of political-eco-
nomic order that can address the defects of private property and market allocation
without working serious damage of its own. The classic socialist alternative is a
system of public ownership and economic planning. Such a system would, so the
argument goes, redress the inegalitarian implications of capitalism by socializing
the right to benefit from the use of productive resources. Furthermore it would
eliminate constraints on liberty imposed by capitalism by socializing the right to
determine the allocation of productive resources. And it would address the
motivational implications of capitalism by transforming the process of resource
allocation into a public process in which issues of the common good would
provide the explicit theme in economic decisions.
Welfarism?
This sketch of a route from the abstract ideal of a free community of equals
to a socialist implementation of that ideal is, to be sure, overdrawn and depends
on an exaggerated set of contrasts-between market and plan, between private
and public ownership. I offer it here simply as a reminder of the role of that ideal
in familiar arguments for socialism. And I offer the reminder because the ideal of
a free community of equals is a fundamental and attractive social ideal which is
both more plausible than, and captures the underlying values of, the socialist
tradition better than does the narrowly welfarist normative position that
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Przeworski draws on. While I cannot discuss either of these points in detail here,
I will say a few words about each.
Much of Przeworski's discussion proceeds on the assumption that the proper
way to evaluate political-economic arrangements is to ask which is best able to
maximize social welfare.7 Moreover'he understands welfare subjectively, as the
satisfaction of preferences.8 But subjective welfarism is, I think, not a reasonable
foundation for such evaluations. Given the malleability of preferences and their
commonly unreflective character, it is not at all clear that preference satisfaction
is a plausible account of welfare. Furthermore given the fact that some preferences
are unreasonable, there are difficulties in defending preference satisfaction as a
suitable basis for collective choice. And given the ethical importance of the human
capacity to regulate and to revise preferences on reflection, a suitable foundation
for evaluating alternative political-economic constitutions needs to take into
consideration-as the democratic ideal does-the implications of different con-
stitutions for the development and exercise of this capacity and not simply for
subjective welfare.
As to the connections to the socialist tradition, I take it to be a central part of
the case for socialism that socialism can provide conditions in which individuals,
groups, and the people collectively can freely deliberate about what is worth
preferring and doing and act on the basis of those deliberations and not simply
pursue the satisfaction of defacto preferences, which may themselves be trans-
formed through deliberation. So, for example, the case for public ownership-as
I indicated earlier-is not simply that it enables the optimal satisfaction of
preferences or that it permits the allocation of welfare that the people would
choose if they were to pick the allocation but that it frees people to consider how
best to use resources without subjecting their reflection to the constraints imposed
by the private control of resources.
This difference in interpretations of the fundamental values has important
consequences when we move from matters of value to questions of comparative
institutional evaluation and institutional design. In particular, we cannot settle
these questions by deciding which arrangements would best promote the satisfac-
tion of defacto preferences. Instead we need to consider as well how a proposed
set of arrangements would assure fundamental liberties, how they accommodate
the pluralism that inevitably follows on the protection of those liberties, and
whether they can be expected to encourage an allegiance to the ideal of free
association among equals that is sufficiently strong to preserve the stability of
institutions that conform to that ideal. The implications of this point will become
more clear as we proceed.
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43
POLITICS & SOCIETY
RATIONALITY AND FEASIBILITY
According to Przeworski, capitalism is irrational, and socialism is not fea-
sible. After outlining his argument for those conclusions, I want to raise three
objections to it.
Main Argument
Przeworski's argument is built on, inter alia, the following three claims:
Capitalist obstruction thesis: There are technically feasible, efficient allocations
of welfare that cannot be achieved as equilibria of a capitalist economy
Socialist blueprint thesis: There is a characterization of a socialist economy-a
socialist blueprint-from which we can derive that all technically feasible,
efficient allocations can be achieved by a socialist economy.
Socialist obstruction thesis: Given realistic assumptions about human motiva-
tions, a socialist economy cannot achieve all technically feasible, efficient
allocations.
Przeworski's defense of the capitalist obstruction thesis appears to depend
on a general skepticism about the possibility of separating the allocative and
distributive functions of prices without damaging consequences (see, for exam-
ple, p. 25). If an economy uses prices to allocate resources but then fixes the
rewards for different factors of production through redistributive transfers or a
social dividend, it will suffer from deadweight losses. That is, it will not make
full use of productive potential since people will not be drawn to the highest-
priced use of their resources in the way that they would be if the price specified
the terms of their reward for the use of their resources.9 If this is true, it is not a
necessary truth or a fact about the "logic" of markets. A price (when markets are
working perfectly) indicates the value of a good as determined by people's
willingness to pay for it. It is certainly possible for a person to put goods that he
or she owns or controls to their highest-price use even though the person does not
expect to be rewarded by being paid that price. l °
I will return to this issue later. What matters here is that, since Przeworski
assumes that allocative and distributive uses of prices need to go together on pain
of deadweight losses, the capitalist obstruction thesis really states a point not just
about capitalism but about markets generally:
Market obstruction thesis: There are technically feasible, efficient allocations of
welfare that cannot be achieved as equilibria of a market economy. 1
Set against this background, Przeworski's argument about the irrationality of
capitalism comes to this: The conjunction of the market obstruction and socialist
blueprint theses shows that capitalism is irrational because it prevents the achieve-
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ment of desirable allocations. The rationality of socialism, by contrast, follows
from socialist blueprint, which tells us that socialism itself does not obstruct any
allocations. But at the same time socialist blueprint and socialist obstruction
together support the conclusion that socialism is not feasible. For socialist
blueprint tells us that the ideal blueprint is workable while socialist obstruction
implies that it is unreasonable, given realistic assumptions about people, to expect
socialism to work according to its ideal blueprint.
Three Objections
I find the account of rationality and feasibility unhelpful for three reasons.
The first two have to do with methods of comparison while the third makes a more
substantive point about the foundations of the charge against capitalism.
First it is a platitude about rationality that the rational choice is the best
feasible choice. I do not see why then we should conclude from market obstruc-
tion and socialist blueprint that capitalism is irrational instead of concluding from
the former and socialist obstruction that it may or may not be, depending on how
far short of the blueprint a realistic socialism falls. Nor do I see why socialist
blueprint implies that socialism is rational. Why not conclude from market
obstruction and socialist obstruction that blueprints do not decide the issue of
rationality? 12
Przeworski appears to assume that the charge of irrationality depends only
the availability of an alternative blueprint 13 regardless of judgments about how
that blueprint is likely to work. While I agree with him that blueprints matter to
us as "political beings," (p. 4) I do not think it is rational for them to matter this
way. It makes no sense to condemn an arrangement as irrational when we have a
blueprint for a better arrangement but believe that the blueprint is sufficiently
unlikely to work that the "better arrangement" will work less well in practice.
Putting aside the platitudinous connection between rationality and feasibility,
think of the problem as a matter of the choice of a political-economic constitution
by "the people." They know from market obstruction and socialist obstruction
that, whichever system they choose, they will not be able to achieve all the
technically feasible allocations. While the explanation of that inability may differ
between the two cases, the fact remains that no system in the choice set makes
available the full complement of technically feasible allocations. If this is so, then
the choice of capitalism cannot be condemned as irrational merely because
capitalism (like all the other systems) closes off alternatives. The fact that it less
desirable than a system that does not exclude any allocations but that is infeasible
and so not in the choice set may be a matter of regret. But it does not condemn
the choice of capitalism as irrational.
Second I am perplexed by the discussion of the feasibility of socialism.
Przeworski has, I think, adopted a rather special use of the term "feasibility,"
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according to which a system is infeasible just in case a realistic appraisal of it
shows that it lacks the virtues attributed to it by its proponents. So, for example,
if we cannot realistically expect markets to achieve efficient equilibria, then
capitalism is infeasible. (p. 12) At the same time, since the classical defense of
capitalism does not promise that it can be used to achieve the efficient allocation
of welfare preferred by the people, the feasibility of capitalism is not challenged-
as is the feasibility of socialism-by the fact that it cannot.
My quarrel here is not with the terminology-though I do think it is a little
misleading-but rather with the relevance of assessments of feasibility under-
stood this way. The questions of central relevance in the comparative evaluation
of political-economic systems are: (1) What are reasonable norms for the evalu-
ation of social systems, and (2) which system best conforms to these norms? If
achieving an egalitarian allocation of welfare is a reasonable requirement, then it
is not really relevant to an evaluation of capitalism that classical blueprints of
capitalism did not argue that capitalism could achieve such an allocation. The fact
that they did not may tell us something about the limited moral vision of those
who formulated the blueprints. But the limits of their vision are irrelevant in
deciding about the reasonableness of capitalism itself. Unless our purposes are
polemical, what we want to know is what different systems are capable of
delivering and not simply whether they can deliver on the promises of their
proponents.
Third according to Przeworski, capitalism is irrational because it obstructs
the allocation that is preferred by "'the people,' in its eighteenth-century singular."
(p. 11) That allocation fully employs productive resources while differing from
the market allocation in being more egalitarian. I agree that natural interpretations
of the claim that the people have distributive preferences make those distributive
preferences egalitarian. But I have two problems with Przeworski's account of
the democratic foundations of egalitarianism.
First the "natural" interpretations of the people's distributive preferences that
I have just alluded to deploy either veil of ignorance constructions or a delibera-
tive conception of rationality to set constraints on the kinds of reasons that citizens
can use in defending fundamental distributive norms-for example, that the
reasons have to be consistent with the moral equality of citizens-and argue that
the acceptable reasons have egalitarian implications. 14 In keeping with subjective
welfarism, Przeworski, as I understand him, proposes that the egalitarianism of
the people's preferences can be derived even without such constraints on reasons.
In particular, he takes it to be an implication of the fact that the people's preferred
allocation is that allocation that would be chosen in a democratic procedure for
the aggregation of de facto preferences. The intuition is that a democratic
procedure assigns equal weight to the preferences of each and so would generate
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a more egalitarian allocation than a market procedure that weights preferences by
wealth.
Intuition, however, is not a reliable guide here for majority rule assigns equal
weight to the preferences of each. But if "democratically chosen" is interpreted
as "chosen through majority rule," the argument for the egalitarianism of the
people's preferences runs into trouble because of the instability of majority rule.
Majority rule is said to be unstable because there is virtually never a majority rule
winner from a set of alternatives, and when there is not a majority rule winner,
majority rule cycles cover the entire space of possible outcomes.15 So majority
rule does not even guarantee that productive resources will be fully employed,
much less that welfare will be roughly equally allocated.
The analysis of structure-induced equilibria--of majority-rule equilibria that
emerge from institutional constraints within majority rule institutions-has
brought determinateness back to the study of majority rule. 16 But, putting aside
the complicated issue of the relationship between a structure-induced equilibrium
and what the people prefer, there is in general no reason to expect that the
institutional constraints that lead to equilibrium also will lead the majority to
choose to fully employ productive resources.
Second suppose that there were a determinate allocation, different from the
market allocation, that the people would choose if they were evaluating alloca-
tions in abstraction from the institutions that might generate them. Suppose, too,
that the preferred allocation would be inaccessible given a market system of
resource allocation. Still it would not follow that the people ought to reject
markets. Indeed the fact that markets prevent certain otherwise-desirable out-
comes might actually be a desirable feature of them. For example, the people
might, in a constitutional convention, choose to adopt a market scheme knowing
that a byproduct of that system is the exclusion of certain allocations that the
people find desirable but believing at the same time that the adoption of an
alternative system that would permit the choice of those allocations would have
other damaging consequences. For example, it is commonly said that private
property or markets are necessary for the protection of noneconomic liberties,
including the liberties associated with political democracy. Suppose then that
private property or market allocation mechanisms inevitably exclude relatively
equal distributions of income and welfare or more minimally do not guarantee
such distributions even when it is widely agreed that they would be a good thing.
Even if one thought that such distributions were good, one might still rationally
adopt a scheme of private property in order to preserve democratic liberties.
I do not find this familiar argument compelling. The point of mentioning it is
only to underscore that a reasonable assessment of the virtues of alternative
political-economic constitutions must meet it. But, to return to my main theme,
meeting it requires attention to matters that extend beyond the welfare conse-
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quences of alternative systems and depends in particular on showing that there is
a workable system that protects fundamental liberties and has egalitarian distrib-
utive implications.
Attractions of the Blueprint: The Administration of Things
According to Przeworski, the socialist blueprint provides an attractive ideal
that is not workable because people are self-interested. I want to propose some
doubts about the ideal that do not derive from the fact of self-interest.
I want to emphasize that the doubts I will discuss do not have definite
implications for the virtues of public ownership or planning themselves since they
are not the only components of the blueprint. Instead the blueprint also includes
three behavioral norms whose satisfaction is required if an economy with public
ownership and planning is to "generate all the wonderful effects its proponents
advertise" (p. 12)-a combination of the optimal utilization of resources and an
egalitarian distribution of welfare. The norms are: (1) that citizens truthfully
reveal all relevant private information about talents, technologies, and tastes to
the planner; (2) that planners conscientiously work out a plan that maximizes
social welfare; and (3) that managers comply with the commands of planners and
workers comply with the commands of managers. These three assumptions give
content to the idea that socialism is the "rational administration of things to satisfy
human needs," where the model of the rational administration of things is a single
agent who musters all of his/her powers in pursuit of a goal.17 My doubts about
the blueprint arise from doubts about this "single agent" model of social rational-
ity.
Two Foundationsfor the Blueprint
What, then, are the problems with the blueprint? To answer this question, let
us consider what it would take for the three behavioral norms to be satisfied. There
are two possibilities here the first of which is associated with a "mechanism
design" analysis of socialism.
In the mechanism design framework, socialism is modeled as a system with
a planner who seeks to maximize social welfare and with utility-maximizing
citizens who have private information that the planner must elicit in order to
develop a welfare-maximizing plan. The planner's problem is to design an
incentive scheme such that each citizen maximizes utility by truthfully revealing
the private information relevant to picking the welfare-maximizing allocation.
Przeworski expresses some (well-founded) skepticism about solving the incen-
tive problem within this framework, and I want to supplement his doubts.
Assume, then, that a welfare-maximizing planner could devise a set of
incentives that would elicit the information needed to maximize social welfare.
Still there would remain the question: What incentive does the planner have for
nl
48
JOSHUA COHEN
maximizing social welfare? The mechanism design framework assumes a sharp
disparity between the motivations of planners, who seek to maximize social
welfare, and the motivations of everyone else who are self-interested utility
maximizers. But no serious account of socialism, or any other system, can rest on
such an assumption.
Once upon a time, it might have been argued that the assumption of motiva-
tional disparity is legitimate because we can assume that the planners belong to
the party and the party can be trusted to do what is right. Dismissing that thought
without further comment, one could reject the assumption of motivational dispar-
ity, model the planner as a utility maximizer, and then try to solve the problem of
motivating a utility-maximizing planner to maximize social welfare. The natural
thought would be to subject the planner to democratic control and then to argue
that the combination of electoral threats, legislative oversight, and interest group
mobilization might work to provide planners with an incentive to maximize social
welfare. 18
But in fact this proposal just makes the incentive problem more complicated.
For we now need a description of a set of political mechanisms that might support
the contention that officials (in particular planners) with no direct interest in
maximizing social welfare will be constrained by electoral incentives to act as if
they had such an interest. I know of no argument-certainly no robust argument-
that supports the contention that in a world of utility maximizers the democratic
process would constrain planners to maximize social welfare and to design a
mechanism (assuming that there is one) that would implement that requirement.
The second route to providing foundations for the three behavioral norms,
then, is to assume that all citizens take a direct interest in maximizing social
welfare. 19 On this second strategy, the satisfaction of the behavioral norms would
reflect: (1) the fact that it is psychologically possible to separate willingness to
perform (to provide information and to comply) from expectations of material
compensation 20 and (2) the fact that the public ownership and the planned
allocation of resources encourages such separation. The (familiar) thought would
be that, when ownership is socialized, citizens come to think of themselves as
members of a community that owns.productive resources, and their motivations
reflect that self-conception. As a consequence of these motivational changes,
citizens would truthfully reveal private information and would act in conformity
to their instructions.
Troubles in Paradise
Przeworski's argument about the rationality-but-infeasibility of socialism
rests on his rejection of (2), though parts of his discussion suggests that he finds
(1) implausible as well. In particular, public ownership and planning cannot be
expected to eliminate self-interest, and in the face of self-interest, the three
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behavioral norms are almost certain to be violated. Even on the assumption of a
democratic socialism, we cannot expect citizens to subordinate their own advan-
tage to the maximization of social welfare; citizens will distort information,
planners will steal, and workers and managers will shirk even if they know that
the demands made on them are part of a fair system.
In a discussion of the Soviet economy in the period of war communism,
Kritsman pointed to the central issue. Criticizing the idea that a "non-commodity
economy, i.e. a natural economy, is necessarily a non-anarchical, i.e. planned
economy," he noted that "[flor an economy to be anarchic it is necessary and
sufficient for there to be a multiplicity of independent subjects." 21 Przeworski's
argument for the infeasibility of the socialist blueprint emphasizes, to use Krits-
man's terms, one way that independence is achieved within a noncommodity
economy-namely through the continued presence of self-interest.
But there are other forms of human independence than selfishness and
problems for the blueprint that reflect disagreements that are not reducible to
selfishness. Even if (1) and (2) were both true and all citizens were quite prepared
to act from their judgments of the common advantage, disagreements among them
could be expected to remain and those disagreements might suffice to produce
violations of the behavioral norms. 22
Suppose, for example, that some citizens think that the planners (perhaps
acting in good faith) are pursuing a potentially disastrous strategy of development
in some specific domain. Suppose, for example, that they are encouraging
automobile production in the face of what some citizens judge to be serious threats
of environmental harm with significant implications for future generations. Or
suppose that some citizens believe that the encouragement of biotechnology is
proceeding without sufficient attention to potential health effects, and as a result,
they refuse to provide information or resist acting on the instructions of planners
or managers until public hearings have been held to address the dangers.
It is, I think, a serious mistake to suppose that such disagreements and the
violations of the behavioral norms that issue from them must in the end be founded
on self-interest or class interest. Reasonable people attach different weights to
different goods and have different expectations about future consequences and
different understandings about our obligations to future generations.23 Even when
people are prepared to give priority to considerations of the common good in
matters of collective choice, to "exert effort independently of reward," (p. 12) and
even when they agree in general terms about what the common good consists in,
they can be expected to disagree about how best to promote the common good.
The problem with the blueprint then is that it stipulates the satisfaction of the
three behavioral norms. But their satisfaction requires either that there are no such
disagreements or that there are disagreements but that citizens all accept the
planners' judgments as authoritative. In either case, the blueprint has problems.
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Consider first the possibility that there are no disagreements. How could this
be? We are supposing a society in which people are free to reflect on political
issues and in which they apply themselves conscientiously to that task. Under
these conditions, it seems inevitable that citizens will come to different views
about public questions. The only way they could all hold the same view as the
planners is if they accept the planners' views as their own-that is, if they lack
independence of judgment.
The second alternative is to acknowledge that there are reasonable disagree-
ments but to suppose that citizens fully cooperate (in terms of information and
compliance) because they regard the planners as authoritative as a consequence
of their democratic authorization. If blueprint socialism is set within a democratic
framework-in which planners are appointed by elected legislators with over-
sight responsibilities and the plans themselves are a subject of open public
debate-and if citizens cooperate as a consequence of the legitimacy that frame-
work confers on the planners, there appears to be nothing unattractive about the
ideal blueprint. What it requires is not a blind willingness to suppress disagree-
ments but a willingness to resolve them through open public procedures and not
to try to thwart the decisions reached through those procedures by withholding
information or refusing to comply with legitimate commands.
But this response is unsatisfactory. If citizens comply because of the legiti-
macy conferred on planners by democratic procedures, they will comply even if
they think that the planners are not maximizing social welfare. And that will defeat
the argument for the welfare-maximizing consequences of compliance and so
defeat the case for planning as Przeworski presents it. On the other hand, if they
comply just in case they are confident that the planners are acting to maximize
social welfare, then, given reasonable disagreement, they will sometimes not
comply.
The problem with the blueprint then does not lie in its unrealistical assumption
that people are not selfish-though that may be unrealistic. The problem lies in
a tension between two elements of the ideal. On the one hand, the ideal is a
democratized economy. On the other, the characterization of the ideal assumes
away familiar sources of political conflict that cannot be expected to disappear
even under ideally democratic conditions. For part of what makes political
conditions ideally democratic is the assurance of deliberative liberties for citi-
zens-liberties of conscience, expression, and association required for individual
reflection and social deliberation. But given the protection of those liberties,
different people, reasoning in good faith, will arrive at different views about what
is valuable in life and diverse views about the implications of consensual political
principles and values for particular issues of ongoing controversy. And given
those differences, it is unreasonable to expect the sorts of behavior stipulated in
the blueprint.
____ _I
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In a nutshell, my contention is that the blueprint is unattractive because its
ideal functioning depends on the absence of the kinds of disagreement that come
with the territory of a well-functioning democratic society.
The Limits of Markets
Finally I come to the remarks about markets that provide the foundation for
Przeworski's argument for the irrationality of capitalism. Recall the market
obstruction thesis:
There are technically feasible, efficient allocations of welfare that cannot be
achieved as equilibria of a market economy.
This thesis contradicts the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
While the first theorem establishes that market equilibria are efficient, the second
theorem states roughly that for any Pareto-efficient allocation, there exists a set
of prices that support that allocation as a market equilibrium.2 4 So the second
theorem conflicts with the charge against markets that I noted earlier in this article
that markets inevitably tie material compensation to ownership or contribution
and in so doing generate an unjustifiably unequal distribution of advantage.
There is of course no point arguing with a theorem. But it is not clear how
much trouble the second theorem actually presents to Przeworski since it is
arguably irrelevant to understanding a capitalist economy. The second theorem
makes an assertion about existence: that for any finmal allocation of welfare there
exists some initial distribution of resources that will generate the allocation in
equilibrium. But, even abstracting from the problems of acquiring the information
needed to fix the proper initial distribution of resources, a natural way to achieve
some of the efficient allocations would be for the government to redistribute
property rights. And such redistribution violates a basic rule of the game of
capitalism.
But given that Przeworski's claim about irrationality appears to extend to a
point about all market economies (see market obstruction), let us not focus on
capitalism and consider instead the thesis that markets themselves are irrational
because they impose deadweight losses as a cost of ensuring a fair distribution of
rewards. So even in a world with only wage income, the people cannot simply
pick their favorite distribution because it is necessary to pay according to work
in order to motivate contribution according to ability.
The basic line of reasoning that leads to this conclusion is familiar. The state
could in principle achieve its desired allocation by imposing lump-sum taxes on
potential earnings-for example, on abilities rather than on the income earned by
using them. If the taxes are properly set, individuals with abilities that are highly
valued by others would have to use those abilities in order to pay their (high)
taxes, and others would share the benefits from their use of them. But, putting
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aside ethical objections to the use of ability taxes 25 as a way of ensuring that each
contributes according to ability, in order to fix the proper tax levels the state would
need to acquire privately held information about preferences, technlmologies, and
abilities. Because their abilities will be taxed, individuals will typically have
incentives to underreport their abilities. And that underreporting will result in
underutilization of productive capacity.
On the other hand, if taxes are set on actual rather than potential earnings, the
taxes will be distortionary and produce deadweight losses.26 To be sure, the
resulting deadweight loss may be "worth the price" in terms of social welfare.
But still the result is again an underutilization of productive potential. There exists
a way to use that potential to make everyone better off though there is no way to
get the information required to achieve the more efficient outcome. 27
This is the textbook story from public economics. As Stiglitz summarizes it,
"the use of distortionary taxes is an inevitable consequence of our desire to
redistribute income in a world in which the government can observe the charac-
teristics of individuals only imperfectly." 28
But three qualifications of the story are necessary in connection with an
argument about the irrationality of markets. First as my earlier remarks indicate,
contentions about irrationality depend for their support on the availibility of
alternatives, and it is not clear that there is a reasonable alternative to markets that
makes full utilization and fair distribution compatible.
Second neither the extent nor even, strictly speaking, the fact of deadweight
losses is a direct consequence of the use of the market as an allocative mechanism.
The crucial fact is how people respond to changes in compensation. Does the
alteration of market incomes through taxes and transfers lead people to substitute
leisure for labor? And if it does, what is the magnitude of this substitution effect?
These are complicated empirical questions. But, while there are "elasticity
pessimists," most estimates of the substitution effect put it pretty low. In the
United States, for example, the average estimate implies that it would take a 37
percent tax on wage income to generate a deadweight loss amounting to 2 percent
of the revenue raised by the tax.29
Third it is not clear that we should suppose that the substitution effect is
exogenous and that policy must adjust to it.30 Suppose, for example, that the
government pursues active labor-market policies to ensure the best utilization of
productive resources, that there are substantial redistributive taxes, and that
citizens believe that the taxes are fair because they help to ensure a society in
which each citizen has equal access to the advantages of social cooperation.
Suppose, too, that work is so organized as to be both interesting and manifestly
a contribution to a decent society. And suppose as well that markets are embedded
within a framework of relational contracting in which contractual parties expect
to have long-term connections and so come to appreciate that their fates are linked.
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Then, on the reasonable assumption that norms (including norms of fairness) play
an important role in governing economic choices, 31 it is plausible that citizens
would see their exertions as contributing to the general welfare and that their
willingness to exert effort might therefore be relatively insensitive to material
compensation.
Here we return to one of the components of the ideal of a free community of
equals that I noted in the first section of this article, the idea that in such a
community people willingly act in ways that contribute to the common advantage
without demanding rewards'for their contributions that conflict with that advan-
tage. And because of those willing contributions, equality of advantage is consis-
tent with a reasonable level of advantage for all. If the remarks in the last
paragraph have force, it is not clear that the existence of markets threaten this
aspect of the ideal. As a consequence, it is also not clear that market economies
are irrational and certainly not true-here I agree with Przeworski (p. 24)-that
the degree of their irrationality is given. As the second welfare theorem asserts,
the existence of markets does not itself imply that policies aimed at ensuring a
fair distribution must be paid for in deadweight losses. Whether there are such
losses at all and if there are losses what their extent is depends on social and
political background conditions.
A natural response to these remarks is that it is psychologically unrealistic to
expect agents in a market economy to be so unresponsive to income changes.
Here we arrive at a question about the use of markets that is as fundamental as it
is hard to answer: Just what are the effects of market allocative mechanisms on
human self-conceptions and motivations? Socialists have characteristically sup-
posed that markets induce a narrow particularism, generating illusions about
human independence, indifference to the interests of (most) others, and an
instrumental (commodifying) understanding of human interactions that tends to
spill over beyond the market itself.32 Altogether they encourage a set of self-un-
derstandings and motivations that are bound to conflict with the substantive
conceptions of freedom and equality ingredients in the ideal of a free community
of equals.
But as my remarks on the endogenousness of the substitution effect indicated,
the motivational effects of markets may not be quite so determinate. That is true
in part because of the variety of market systems from more laissez faire systems
to contemporary capitalism, in which markets are set within a framework of
relational contracts, long-term agreements, subcontracts, joint ventures, quasi-in-
tegration, informal understandings, and more formal processes of collaboration
achieved through regional and national organizations. Furthermore markets are
always embedded in specific social and political arrangements, and it is not clear
why we should expect the motivational effects of market interactions to spill over
into these other spheres rather than expecting the motivational effects of other
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domains to spill over into the economy. From Hegel to Rawls, from discussions
of societal corporatism to accounts of social democracy and market socialism,
social theorists have speculated about the ways that the proper associative and
political setting of markets might provide a way to take advantage of the virtues
of markets-allocative efficiency and the decentralization of economic power-
while at the same time sustaining the motivations needed to ensure the subordi-
nation of the operations of markets to reasonable political ideals.33
In the end arguments about the vices of markets as such depend on contentions
about the formation of motivations that would defeat all such speculations. In the
absence of a more compelling case for those contentions, and in the absence of a
plausible and well-defined alternative to market coordination, we lack compelling
grounds for condemning markets as irrational and as essentially hostile to the ideal
of a free community of equals.
NOTES
1. All references to Przeworski's article are included parenthetically in the text.
2. For critical discussions of subjective welfarism, see, among others, Ronald Dwor-
kin, "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10,
no. 3 (Summer 1981): 185-246; John Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds. (Cambridge, Eng.:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 159-185; Amartya Sen, "Well-Being, Agency, and
Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984," Journal of Philosophy, 82, no. 4 (April 1985):
169-221; and Cass Sunstein, "Preferences and Politics," Philosophy and Public Affairs,
forthcoming.
3. The earlier parts of Przeworski's article (the second section) present a classical
marxian (and neoliberal) argument that distribution is not amatter of political choice while
the discussion of social democracy at pp. 22-24 draws on the Millian and social democratic
view that it is (see pp. 23-24 for a brief of discussion of this point). I am somewhat
perplexed by this disparity. But if Przeworski means to suggest that it remains an open
question which view is right, I agree.
4. Perhaps they regard it as a great value as well. On pluralism and political community,
see John Rawls, "The Domain of the Political and Overlappping Consensus," New York
University Law Review 64, no. 2 (May 1989): 233-255; and Joshua Cohen, "Pluralism and
Moral Consensus," forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Davis Conference on Democ-
racy.
5. The idea that effort might be exerted independently of reward provides a common
ground in the views of Marx and John Stuart Mill. In Marx, this idea is expressed in the
principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." While Mill
would never have predicted that effort would eventually be severed from reward, he did
think that possibility could not be excluded. He thought that "[m]ankind are capable of a
far greater amount of public spirit than the present age is accustomed to suppose possible,"
and that a "communist association" would provide fertile soil for the growth of that spirit.
As a result he thought that it might well be a mistake to suppose that "honest and efficient
labor is to be had only from those who are themselves individually to reap the benefit of
their own exertions." See his Principles of Political Economy, Book 2, chapter 1, section
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3, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 2, J. M. Robson, ed. (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 202-210.
6. The socialist conception, of course, is not that private ownership and markets are
the only unacceptable constraints currently in force. The organization of the family-the
domestic division of labor-and sexual inequality within labor markets also impose
unacceptable barriers to equality.
7. In other discussions of normative issues, Przeworski does not confine himself to
issues of preference satisfaction. See, for example, the "Postscript" to Capitalism and
Social Democracy (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
8. On different conceptions of welfare, see James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford, Eng.:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
9. Thus the irrationality of both social democracy and market socialism, see pp. 22-24.
10. Classical models of market socialism, for example, supposed that managers of
firms might act as profit maximizers even if they did not appropriate the profits.
11. Doesn't this assertion flatly contradict the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics? I will discuss this question later.
12. Przeworski of course agrees that we cannot decide which systems are likely to
perform best by considering their abstract blueprints (pp. 18-24). My point is that
blueprints do not settle issues of rationality.
13. This is suggested by the remarks at p. 4.
14. For veil of ignorance constructions, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Ronald Dworkin, "'What is Equality? Part
2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, no. 4 (Fall 1981): 283-345.
On deliberative conceptions, see Joshua Cohen, "The Economic Basis of Deliberative
Democracy," Social Philosophy and Policy 6, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 25-50; and "Dahl on
Democracy," Journal of Politics, forthcoming. In general, see Thomas Scanlon, "Con-
tractualism and Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Eng.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982,), pp. 103-128.
15. That is, beginning from any outcome, we can arrive at any other outcome through
finitely many majority-rule decisions.
16. Beginning with Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in
Multi-Dimensional Voting Models," American Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2
(February 1979): 27-59.
17. See, for example, the comparision that Marx draws between the case of Robinson
Crusoe working alone and the case of a community of free individuals in his discussion of
conditions that do not display commoditiy fetishism. Capital, vol. 1, Ben Fowkes, trans.
(Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penquin Books, 1976), pp. 171-172.
18. This is Bentham's problem of the "artificial identification of interests." See the
discussion in chapter 5 of Ross Harrison, Bentham (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1983).
19. I assume that citizens also have ideals, aspirations, and preferences that are not
reflected in the social welfare function; in Rousseau's terms, they have a general and a
particular will. What matters here is only that they have a social welfare function (a
conception of the common good) and that they are prepared to rest their judgments in
contexts of public choice on their social welfare function.
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20. It is tempting to say that the blueprint depends on a sharp separation between
contribution and reward. But that temptation ought to be resisted since doing something
of value to others may have its own intrinsic rewards.
21. Cited in Michael Ellman, Socialist Planning, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989), pp. 47-48.
22. Przeworski notes this in passing in footnote 43, but pays insufficient attention to
the point.
23. In the Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx makes a very perplexing remark about
intergenerational issues. Rejecting the Lassallean idea that the "undiminished proceeds of
labor" should simply be distributed to workers, Marx notes that, for example, some portion
of those proceeds needs to be saved for the "expansion of production." He then says that
savings for these and other purposes "are an economic necessity and their magnitude is to
be determined according to available means and forces, and partly by computation of
probabilities, but they are in no way calculable by equity." Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed.,
Robert Tucker, ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 529. What Marx leaves out here is the
role that judgments about the obligations of the current generation to future generations
mightplay in fixing the rate of savings. Perhaps these are notproperly understood as matters
of equity. But it does not follow that they are simply matters of "available means and forces"
and the "computation of probabilities."
24. The proof of the second theorem, like the proof of the first, assumes among other
things that there are no externalities.
25. For discussion, see Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 2." Dworkin argues that an
ability tax is the moral equivalent of slavery for the talented. Consider Jones, with potential
to be a great brain surgeon. Since people place a high value on the skills of brain surgeons,
Jones will have to pay a high tax simply by virtue of having that socially valuable skill.
But suppose that Jones hates the idea of being a brain surgeon and aspires to be a political
philosopher on which others place a much lower value. In order to pay the tax, Jones will
face the following choice: (1) Be a brain surgeon, which means doing something that he
hates and earning a high salary to pay the high ability tax, or (2) be a political philosopher,
which means doing something that he values more, earning a lower salary, and-as a
consequence of the ability tax-facing a lower standard of living than other political
philosophers who love what he loves and do what he does but do not have to pay such a
high ability tax.
26. The only nondistortionary taxes are lump-sum taxes, whose yield is independent
of individual behavior. As long as there is some substitution effect from changes in
compensation (the compensated elasticity of labor supply is nonzero), other taxes are
distortionary. The magnitude of the deadweight losses depends on the compensated
elasticity, and there is considerable controversy about its magnitude. See for example J.
Pencavel, "Labor Supply of Men," Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 1, O. Ashenfelter
and R. Layard, eds. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986).
27. Marx thought that in a communist society each would contribute according to
ability. I assume that he did not think that this contribution would require ability taxes.
Rather he supposed, inter alia, that work in a communist society-because of both its social
organization and its intrinsic interest-would not be a means to reward but an "end in
itself." I take this claim about work as an end in itself to imply the separation of exertion
and material compensation.
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28. Joseph Stiglitz, The Economics of the Public Sector, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton,
1988), p. 481.
29. Pencavel, "Labor Supply of Men."
30. See for example, the discussion of relational contracting, fairness, and efficiency
in Ronald Dore, Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic
Issues (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987), chap. 9.
31. See, for example, George A. Akerlof, "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,"
in Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market, George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen,
eds. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 66-92; Daniel Kahneman,
Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,"
in Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, Robin M. Hogarth
and Melvin W. Reder, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 101-116.
On the complexities of the role of norms in shaping wage bargaining in particular, see Jon
Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 6.
32. For helpful discussions of these issues, see Albert O. Hirschman, "Rival Views of
Market Society," in Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (New York:
Viking, 1986), pp. 105-141; and Robert Lane, "Market Choice and Human Choice," in
Markets and Justice: Nomos 31, John W. Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, eds. (New
York: New York University Press, 1989), pp. 226-249.
33. See, for example, Rawls's account of the acquisition of an egalitarian sense of
justice through participation in a sequence of associations, from the family to the state in
A Theory of Justice, sections 70-72. Joel Rogers and I are currently writing a book that
addresses the role that intermediate associations might play in reconciling markets with
democratic ideals. See Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, "Secondary Associations in Dem-
ocratic Governance," unpublished draft.
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